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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE O,F UTAH 
SALrr LAI(E COUNTY, et al., 
Respondents, 
-vs.-
LIQUOR COMMISSION, et al., 
Appellants. 
Case 
No. 9207 
BRIEF O·F APIPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an action, filed December 22, 1959, in the 
Third District Court, brought by Salt Lake County 
against the Liquor Control Com1nission, the individual 
commissioners, and individuals Drake and Anderson for 
injunctive relief to prevent the Liquor ·Commission from 
using real property situated in Salt Lake County for 
liquor stores. There are two parcels of land in issue and 
the complaint alleges that individuals Drake are the own-
ers of one and individuals Anderson are the owners of 
the other. 
The basis for the granting of such relief according to 
plaintiff's complaint "\Yas that such stores did not comply 
"ith the require1nents of the county zoning ordinance, 
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as enacted and amended, and further that defendants had 
not complied with the provisions of Title 17-27-8, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended. Chapter 27 of Title 
17 provides for a county planning commission and for the 
establishment of master plans and zoning ordinances to 
be enacted by counties. The chapter furter provides a 
method of application for permission to construct or use 
buildings or structures in accordance with such master 
plans and zoning requirements. 
The District Court, over the signature of Stewart M. 
Hanson, issued an Order to Show Cause, supported by 
affidavit, requiring the defendants to show cause why an 
injunction should not issue. A temporary restraining 
order was not permitted by the court. 
On January 13, 1960 the defendants, Liquor Com-
mission, the individual commissioners and defendants 
Drake made a motion to dismiss and hearing on the Order 
to Show Cause was continued without date until the 
motion to dismiss had been argued. The motion was 
argued January 25th before the Honorable Ray Van Cott, 
Jr., and was denied. 
On February 7, 1960 the Liquor Co1nmission and the 
individual commissioners petitioned this court to be 
granted an interlocutory appeal. On February 9th plain-
tiff filed answer to this petition, and on February 16th 
the court granted an appeal. 
On April 26, 1960, upon stipulation of eounsel, this 
action was dismissed as to the individual commissioners, 
Paul V. ICelly, Allan D. Johnson and J. W. Pace. Since 
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individual defendants, Drake and Anderson,- did not 
choose to appeal or respond, the parties remaining before 
this court are the defendant-appellant, Utah Liquor Con-
trol Commission, and plaintiff-respondent, Salt Lake 
County. 
STATEME:t'~T OF POINTS 
POINiT I 
THE UTAH LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION IS NOT 
SUBJECT TO ZONING REGULATIONS OF SALT LAKE 
COUNTY. 
POINT II 
'THE LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION IS SUBJE·GT TO 
SUIT ONLY UPON CO·MPLIANCE WITH THE PROCEDURE 
OUTLINED IN TITLE 32-1-28, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
1953, REQUIRING THE WRI'TTEN CONSENT OF THE GOV-
ERNOR BEFORE PRO·CEEDINGS MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
POINT III 
THE LIQUOR CONTROL ·COMMISSION, APART FROM 
THE EXCEPTION NOTED IN POINT II, IS IMl\iUNE FROM 
LAWSUIT UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN IM-
MUNITY. 
POINT IV 
THE STATU'TE UPON WHICH SALT LAKE COUNTY 
RELIES PROVIDES BY ITS OWN TERMS THAT DIS-
APPROVAL BY THE CO·UNTY PLANNING COMMISSION 
MAY BE OVERRULED BY A MAJORITY vo·TE OF THE 
PUBLIC AGENCY AUTHORIZING OR FINAN·CING SUCH 
BUILDING, IF SUCH PUBLIC AGENCY IS WITHOUT THE 
JURISDICTION OF THE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; AND 
SU·CH OVERRULING SHOULD BE IMPLIED FROM THE 
LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION'S CONDUCT IN OPENING 
AND OPERATING THE STORES IN QUESTION. 
3 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT V 
THE BUILDINGS IN QUESTIO·N ARE NOT "PUBLIC 
BUILDINGS'' AS DEFINED IN TI'TLE 17-27-8, UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 1953, AS AMENDED, UPON WHICH SALT 
LAKE COUNTY RELIES. 
POINT VI 
THE LIQUOR ·CONTROL COMMISSION IS NOT WITHIN 
THE DEFINITION OF "ANY PERSON, FIRM OR CORPO--
RATION" USED IN TITLE 17-27-23, UTAH CODE ANNO-
TATED 1953, UPON WHICH SALT LAKE COUNTY RELIES. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE UTAH LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION IS NOT 
SUBJE,CT TO ZONING REGULATIONS OF SALT LAKE 
COUNTY. 
The question of regulation of state agencies by muni-
cipalities was first ruled upon by this court in the case 
of Salt Lake City v. Board of Education of Salt Lake 
City, 52 U. 540, 175 P. 65-±. In that case Salt Lake City 
attempted to require the Board of Education of Salt Lake 
City to comply with a municipal fire ordinance in connec-
tion with an addition to an elementary school being con-
structed by the school board. This court cited with ap-
proval the case of Kentucky I nst. for E ducat~on of Blind 
v. City of Louisville, 123 l(y. 767, 97 S.W. 402, 8 L.R.A. 
(NS) 533, in the following language: 
"The principle is that the state, 'vhen creating 
municipal governments, does not cede to them any 
control of the state's property situated "\vithin 
them, nor over any property "\Yhich the state has 
authorized another body or power to control." 
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rrhe court ,vent on to hold that the ·Constitution and the 
statutes of the state gave control of schools and school 
affairs to the respective boards of education and having 
so done, pre-e1npted fro1n municipalities the exercise of 
control over school buildings. 
of North Summit School District, 81 U. 51, 16 P.2d 900. 
f. and approved in the case of Beard v. Board of Educat,ion ~ Salt Lake City case has been cited subsequently 
In Title 32-1-6, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, the Legisla-
ture granted to the Liquor Control Commission the power 
to: 
" (a) Have the general control, management 
and supervision of all liquor stores and package 
agencies. 
"(b) Decide, within the limits and under the 
conditions imposed by this act, the number and 
location of the stores and package agencies to be 
established in the state." (Emphasis added.) 
Title 32-1-12, U.C.A. 1953, further provides: 
"* * * all property acquired, administered, 
possessed or received by the commission, shall be 
the property of the state, * * * ." 
The property in question is owned or possessed by 
the State of Utah and the Legislature has expressly vested 
the exclusive control of said property in the Liquor Con-
trol Commission. Accordingly, under the holding of the 
Salt Lake City case, neither the property nor the com-
mission is subject to regulation on the part of Salt Lake 
County. 
This holding 1s 1n accord "\Yith the overwhelming 
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weight of case law on the subject. See 61 A.L.R. 2d 970 
and 171 A.L.R. 325 ; also see 31 A.L.R. 450. The cases 
cited in these annotations illustrate the generally ac-
cepted rule that governmental agencies are not subject 
to municipal zoning regulations when such agencies are 
performing "governmental" rather than "proprietary" 
functions. 
In the case of Utah Mfrs.' Ass'n. v. Stewart, 82 U. 
198, 23 P.2d 229, this court held that the Liquor Control 
Agency was clearly a governmental rather than a pro-
prietary agency and that control of liquor traffic was a 
proper exercise of the police power of the state and not 
a monopolistic invasion into private enterprise. The 
opinion reads in part : 
"That the prohibition or regulation of the 
manufacture, transportation, sale, and use of alco-
hol and other intoxicating liquors is an exercise 
of the police power of the state admits of no 
doubt." 
Further: 
"It is alleged a monopoly is created because 
no one except the manager designated by the 
Governor may sell alcohol within the state, and 
plaintiff and others similarly situated must pur-
chase from him and no one else the alcohol re-
quired for manufacturing purposes. Ordinarily 
monopolies are regarded as obnoxious, and a state 
Legislature may not, under the guise of police 
power, create a monopoly in any trade or occupa-
tion or article innocuous in itself and the prosecu-
tion of or dealing in which is "\vithin the common 
right of all citizens on equal ter1ns. 19 R.C.L. 14. 
There is, however, no c.ommon right on the part 
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of any person to sell intoxicating liquor, especially 
where the state has undertaken to control or pro-
hibit the traffic as has been done in this state. 
Trageser v. Gray, 73 Md. 250, 20 A. 905, 9 L.R.A. 
780, 25 Am. St. Rep. 587. The right to sell intoxi-
cating liquor is not one of the privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United States which 
the states are forbidden to abridge. McClure v. 
Topf & Wright, 112 Ark. 342, 166 S.W. 174. The 
rule is stated as follo,vs in 19 R.C.L. 14 (Mono-
polies and ·Combinations): 'However partial it 
may seem, the state can create a 1nonopoly of any 
business that is inherently dangerous to society 
and for that reason may lawfully be prohibited by 
it on the grounds of public policy, without violat-
ing any constitutional inhibition, because no per-
son possesses an inherent right to engage in any 
employment, the pursuit of which is necessarily 
detrimental to the public.' 
"And in 6 R.C.L. p. 408 (Constitutional Law), 
as follows: 'For the purposes of government ex-
clusive rights and privileges are occasionally 
granted to particular individuals. When the pub-
lic purpose of such grants is apparent the courts 
as a rule sustain them as in no wise denying to any 
the equal protection of the laws or violating p-ro-
hibitions as to the granting to any one of special 
and exclusive rights or immunities. This principle 
has been applied to sustain the validity of exclu-
sive privileges to remove garbage from cities, to 
dispense intoxicating liquors, to supply school 
books, to operate ferries and to exercise the power 
of eminent domain.' '' (Emphasis added) 
While it is to be observed that this Ste,vart ease was de-
eided during the days of prohibition and related to the 
control agency which preceded the present Liquor Con-
trol Con1mission, the control of that agency over alcohol 
7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and intoxicating liquors was, if anything, rnore stringent 
and far-reaching than the control of the present commis-
sion. Accordingly, since the predecessor agency was held 
to be properly acting in a governmental capacity, and its 
functions were a proper exercise of the police power, the 
present commission's activities must be viewed as coming 
well within the rule laid down in the Stewart case. This 
interpretation is reinforced by the language of Title 
32-1-2, U.C.A. 1953, illustrating the Legislature's intent in 
creating the present commission: 
"This act shall be deemed an exercise of the 
police powers of the state for the protection of 
the public health, peace and morals; to prevent 
the recurrence of abuses associated with saloons; 
to eliminate the evils of unlicensed and unlawful 
manufacture, selling and disposing of alcoholic 
beverages ; and all provisions of this act shall be 
liberally construed for the attainment of these 
purposes." 
Since the Legislature has given exclusive control 
over intoxicating liquors and the dispensing of the same 
to the Liquor Control Comn1ission, and since this court 
has held that such control is a legitimate exercise of the 
state's police power, to require the commission now to 
comply with county zoning ordinances would seriously 
encroach upon that exclusive control. Counties, by the 
simple expedient of zoning regulation, could prevent the 
commission from placing any dispensing agencies 'vithin 
their borders or, if not totally prohibiting, relegate the 
possible location of such stores to such inac.cessible lo-
cations as to make their construction impracticable. Cer-
tainly such a ruling \Yould be a direct negation of the 
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Legislature's edict above cited ordering a broad construc-
tion of the liquor control act to effectuate its purposes. 
POINT II 
'THE LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION IS SUBJE·CT TO 
SUIT ONLY UPON CO·MPLIANCE WITH THE PRO·CEDURE 
OUTLINED IN TITLE 32-1-28, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
1953 REQUIRING THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF THE GOV-
' ERN OR BEFORE PRO·CEEDINGS MAY BE INSTITUTED. 
The language of Title 32-1-28, U.C.A. 1953, provides 
as follows: 
"The commission may with the wr~tten con-
sent of the governor be sued and may institute or 
defend proceedings in any court of law or other-
wise in the name of 'Liquor Control Commission 
of Utah' as fully and effectually to all intents 
and purposes and no such proceedings shall be 
taken against or in the names of the members of 
the commission, and no such pToceedings shall 
abate by reason of any change in the membership 
of the commission by death, resignation or other-
wise, but such proceedings may be continued as 
though such changes had not been made." 
(Emphasis added.) 
No permission from the governor in advance of suit has 
been alleged by plaintiff in this action. 
The above cited provision has been referred to by 
this court in the case of Riggins v. Distr~ct Court of Salt 
Lake County, 89 U. 183, 51 P. 2d 645, at page 661. Be-
fore the court in that case was the objection that the 
Liquor Control Commission could not sue without first 
obtaining the governor's permission. The commission in 
its O\vn name had proceeded in a civil nuisance action 
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and the issue was raised by way of defense. The court 
answered the question in the following language: 
"The point is made that under the provisions 
of section 30 the commission may not sue without 
the written consent of the Governor. That section 
is not open to that construction. The import of 
the language used in that section is that the com-
mission may be sued with the written consent of 
the Governor, but that it may on its own account 
and in its own name institute a suit the same as if 
it were incorporated." 
The above language would indicate that only when the 
commission is sued is the governor's consent necessary-
but it is necessary. 
In the case of State v. Lack, 118 U. 128, 221 P.2d 
852, which was a criminal prosecution for embezzlement 
against an agent of the Liquor Commission, the defend-
ant claimed the criminal proceeding was invavlid since 
the provisions of this section in question had not been 
met. The court there said : 
"The contention of appellant is without 
merit. The quoted provision of the statute in 
question is a part of a chapter of the act which 
relates to its administration and to the po,vers 
and functions of the Liquor Control Commission. 
It grants a ltmited and conditional waiver of the 
immunity of the state and i~ts officials to civil 
suit." (Emphasis added.) 
It would appear, therefore, that this court has recog-
nized that the doctrine of sovereign immunity applies ex-
pressly to the Utah Liquor ·Control Co1runission, exempt-
ing it fron1 suit e~xcept where this ilnmunity is 'vaived by 
10 
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compliance with this procedural requirement of gaining 
the governor's consent. Appellant maintains that this 
element of consent is an essential part of plaintiff's 
pleading and in its absence, plaintiff has no standing 
in court. 
POINT III 
THE LIQUOR CONTROL ·COMMISSION, APART FROM 
THE EXCEPTION NOTED IN POINT II, IS IMMUNE FROM 
LAWSUIT UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN IM-
MUNITY. 
The question of immunity of state liquor agencies 
from lawsuit has been ruled upon in the federal courts 
and in seven state jurisdictions. Perhaps a typical hold-
ing is that of State ex rel. Wilk~nson v. Murphy, 237 Ala. 
332, 186 So. 487, 121 A.L.R. 283, where the court used 
the following language: 
"It has been said in reference to legislation 
concerning intoxicating liquors, that the power of 
the state in this regard is an incident to society's 
right of self-protection. 'It is therefore essentially 
subject to the police power and has been so re-
garded for over a century.' 15 R.c·.L. 254. Its 
regulation and control is held by all the authori-
ties to be a governmental function based upon the 
duty of the government to protect the community 
from crime and the burdens of pauperism. So re-
garded, when the state itself takes over the traffic, 
it is as much in the exercise of a governmental 
function, through the police power, as when it 
works its convicts on farms purchased and in 
factories constructed by the state. 
"As 've read the argument, it is conceded that 
as to regulation, control or prohibition of the 
11 
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liquor traffic, the state is in the exercise of its 
police power and of its governmental functions, 
but that when the state establishes its own liquor 
stores, there is a sudden shift from the police 
power, and the government is then engaged in a 
private enterprise. And this is urged, notwith-
standing the universally recognized principle that 
it is the peculiar function of the lawmakers to 
ascertain and to determine the appropriate meas-
ures to be used in the exercise of this undoubted 
police power. No one has any inherent right to 
engage in the liquor traffic, and this argument 
leads to the illogical result that the state may 
license and delegate to another that which it can-
not do itself. Sound reasoning, we submit, justi-
fies no such conclusion. 
"Police power is inherent in the government, 
and while it may be set aside by the Constitution, 
yet in order to find that it has been so set aside 
the Constitution must plainly so indicate. Relator 
therefor must rest upon section 93 of our Consti-
tution to find such a result. And yet this section 
gives not the slightest indication of any such in-
tention. 
"It follows, therefore, that this police power 
over the liquor traffic is wholly uninfluenced and 
unaffected by any constitutional provision. The 
state as a consequence still posseses the power 
to its fullest extent and the authorities cited dis-
close that laws of this character have been uni-
forn1ly upheld. Indeed, "\Ye find none to the con-
trary." 
The questjon is further annotated at 9 A.L.R. 2d 1284 
and 121 A.L.R. 300. 
The V\reight of authority of all the cases co1npiled in 
these annotations clearly indicates that state liquor 
12 
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agencies are proper adjuncts of state government and 
as such, are irn1nune from suit except in those states 
where the immunity has been expressly eliminated by 
constitutional or statutory provision. Such statutory or 
constitutional elimination has not occurred in the State 
of Utah with the exception 'of the statutory provision 
referred to in Point II of this brief concerning the 
governor's consent. 
The status of the rule of sovereign immunity in Utah 
is commented upon at length in the dissenting opinion 
and Note 9 in the recent case of Springvvlle Banking 
Co. v. Burt-on. ________ Utah ________ , 349 P.2d 157, decided 
Feb. 1, 1960. Note 9 states, at page 168: 
"* * * And why has the Utah legislature en-
acted legislation pern1itting certain state agencies 
to be sued, such as the Road and Liquor c·om-
missions, unless it has been assumed that the 
state enjoys sovereign immunity from suit in 
spite of Art. I, Sec. 22 ~" 
As noted in Note 9, the overwhelming weight of author-
ity supports the doctrine of sovereign immunity, as does 
the holding of the majority opinion. 
With the reservation noted in Point II, appellant 
maintains that the doctrine of sovereign immunity ap-
plies in this fact situation and that the Liquor Control 
Commission, in operating the two stores in question, 
is ilnmune fro1n suit by Salt Lake County. 
POINT IV 
THE STATU'TE UPON WHICH SALT LAKE COUNTY 
RELIES PROVIDES BY ITS OWN TERMS THAT DIS-
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APPROVAL BY THE COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION 
MAY BE OVERRULED BY A MAJORITY VOTE OF THE 
PUBLIC AGENCY AUTHORIZING OR FINAN·CING SUCH 
BUILDING, IF SUCH PUBLIC AGENCY IS WITHOUT THE 
JURISDICTION OF THE CO·UNTY COMMISSIONERS; AND 
SU·CH OVERRULING SHOULD BE IMPLIED FROM THE 
LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION'S CO·NDUCT IN OPENING 
AND OPERATING THE STORES IN QUESTION. 
Title 17-27-8, u~c.A. 1953, as amended, reads as 
follows: 
"Whenever any board of county commis-
sioners shall have adopted an official map of 
the county or any part thereof, then and thence-
forth no pubic road, park or other public way, 
ground, or space, no public building or structure 
or no public utility, whether publicly or privately 
owned, which is not shown or described on the 
official map as part of the approved develop-
ment within the county, shall be constructed 
or authorized in the unincorporated territory of 
the county until and unless the proposed location 
and extent thereof shall have been submitted to 
and ap·proved by such county planning com-
mission; provided, however, that in case of dis-
approval, the said planning commission shall 
communicate its reasons to the board of county 
commissioners of the county in which the public 
way, ground, space, building, structure, or utility 
is proposed to be located; and such board shall 
have the power to overrule such disapproval 
by a vote of not less than a majority of its 
entire membership, and upon such overruling 
said or other official in charge of proposed con-
struetion or authorization may proceed therewith; 
provided fu.rther, hozrever, that if the public 
way, ground, space, bu.ilding, structure, or utility 
be one, the authorizati-on or financ1mg of which 
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does not, under the law governing the same, faU 
w~thin the province of the board of county com-
missioners or other county official or board, then 
the S1,tbm~ssvon to the county planning commis-
sion shall be made by the body or official having 
s nch jurisdiction, and the said planning com-
n~ission's disapproval may be overruled by said 
body by a vote of not less than ,a majoriJty of 
its entire membership or by said off~cial. The 
acceptance, widening, removal, extension, relo-
cation, narro,ving, vacation, abandonment, change 
of use, acquisiton of land for, or sale or lease 
of any road, park, or other public way, ground, 
place, property, or structure shall be subject to 
similar submission and approval, and the failure 
to approve rnay be similarly overruled. The fail-
ure of the commission to act within thirty days 
from and after the date of official submission 
to it shall be deemed approval, unless a longer 
period be granted by the submitting board, body, 
or official." (Emphasis added) 
While this statutory provision has never been con-
strued by this court, appellant maintains that its langu-
age is clear and indicates that in this fact situation, 
since the Utah Liquor Control Commission is the agency 
financing the purchase of the 33rd South building and 
authorizing the lease of and in fact leasing the Kearns 
store, and since further the law governing the operation 
of these stores does not "fall within the province of 
the board of county commissioners or other county 
official or board," the Liquor Control Commission IS 
free to overrule the County Planning Commission. 
\Vbile the Liquor Control Commission has not af-
firmatively ans,vered plaintiff's complaint and has not 
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affirmatively alleged such overruling vote of the ma-
jority of its members, appellant maintains such mini-
sterial act can clearly be m~~~~ commission's 
conduct in operating these stores. 
So, assuming the statute upon which the plaintiff 
relies applies to appellant, which, as noted above, ap-
pellant does not concede, there has, in any event, been 
an implied compliance by appellant with the terms of 
that statute. 
POINT V 
THE BUILDINGS IN QUESTIO·N ARE NOT "PUBLIC 
BUILDINGS'' AS DEFINED IN TTTLE 17-27-8, UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 1953, AS AMENDED, UPON WHICH SALT 
LAKE COUN·TY RELIES. 
In Salt Lake City v. Board of Educat~on of Salt 
Lake City, 52 U. 540, 175 P. 654, this court ruled that 
state-owned buildings were not public buildings, under 
the terms of the ordinance relied upon by Salt Lake 
City, in the following language: 
"* * * If it be conceded, therefore, as it is 
and must be, that the state has not surrendered 
the control over its buildings to the cities, then 
it necessarily follo'\\'"S that the tern1s 'public 
buildings' and 'all buildings' used in the sub-
divisions of section 206, supra (city ordinance), 
'\Vhich we have quoted, do not embrace all build-
ings '\Yithin the cities. ~foreover, if state buildings 
must be excluded, then public school buildings 
Inust like,vise be excluded from those terms." 
\Vhile it is true that the tern1s 4'public buildings" 
eonstrued b~v the court appeared in a Salt Lake City 
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ordinance rather than in this statute relied upon by 
Salt Lake County, the ordinance and the statute have 
the common feature of being zoning regulations, and 
appellant maintains that the same construction should 
be given both. 
POINT VI 
THE LIQUOR ·CONTROL COMMISSIO'N IS NOT WITHIN 
THE DEFINITION OF "ANY PERSON, FIRM OR CORPO-
RATION" USED IN TITLE 17-27-23, UTAH CODE ANN'O-
TATED 1953, UPON WHI~CH SALT LAKE CO·UNTY RELIES. 
The language of Title 17-27-23, U.C.A. 1953, which 
is the penal section of the zoning statute on which Salt 
Lake County relies provides in part: 
'~* * * Any person, firm or corporation vio-
lating any regulation in, or of any provision of, 
any zoning resolution, or any amendment of this 
act, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. * * *" (Em-
phasis added) 
In federal as well as state court, agencies of state 
or federal governments have been held to be without 
the definition of "person" or "corporation." A partial 
list of the cases so holding follows: U. S. v. UniJted 
1llines Workers of Amerioa, 67 S. Ct. 677, 330 U. S. 258, 
91 L.Ed. 884; Hoyt v. Bd. of Civil Service Comm. of 
City of Los Angeles, (Calif.), 132 P.2d 804; Cvty of St. 
Petersburg v. Carter, (Fla.), 39 So.2d 804; Att'y. Gener-
al v. City of Woburn, (Mass.), 79 N.E.2d 187; Poynter 
v. Ottertail County, (Minn.), 25 N.W.2d 708; U. S. v. 
Board of Finance & Revenue, (Pa.), 85 A.2d 156; State 
r. Central Power & Light Co., (Tex.), 161 S.W.2d 766. 
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It is also to be noted that the above-quoted section 
specifies that any violation thereof is a misdemeanor, 
making the statute a criminal one. To subject the Liquor 
Control Commission, therefore, to the provisions of 
this statute would lead to the absurd result of holding 
a state agency guilty of committing a crime against 
the state. 
CONC.LUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, appellant main-
tains that the trial court erred in denying appellant's 
motion to dismiss. Appellant respectfully requests that 
this court reverse the District ·Court with instructions 
that this action be dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WALTER L. BUDGE 
.Attorney General 
GORDON A. MADSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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